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Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tarkastella analyyttisen ajattelutaidon, valikoitujen päätöksen-
teko-ominaisuuksien (aikapreferenssi, riskipreferenssi) sekä temperamentin välisiä yhteyk-
siä. Laajasti sovellettu analyyttisen ajattelutaidon testaamisen väline on Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT; Frederick, 2015). Testi mittaa rationaalista ajattelutaitoa, joka on erotettavissa 
älykkyydestä sekä muista kognitiivisista kyvyistä (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Mikäli 
vahva korrelaatio analyyttisen ajattelutaidon ja eräiden muiden ominaisuuksien välillä kyetään 
todentamaan, auttaa tämä paitsi tunnistamaan yksilöt, joilla hyvä analyyttinen päätöksente-
kokyky on, mutta myös selventämään, mistä analyyttisessä ajattelutaidossa on ilmiönä kyse.  
 
Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on havaittu yhteyksiä yksilön analyyttisen ajattelutaidon (mitattuna 
CRT-testillä), sekä aikapreferenssin ja riskipreferenssin välillä yhdysvaltalaisilla yliopisto-
opiskelijoilla. Tässä tutkimuksessa aikapreferenssiä mitattiin Consideration of Future Conse-
quences -testillä (CFC-14; Joireman, Shaffer, Balliet, & Strathman, 2012). Suomalaisilta yli-
opisto-opiskelijoilta kerätyllä aineistolla pyrittiin replikoimaan aiempia tuloksia (Frederick, 
2015) riskipreferenssin osalta. Tutkimus myös selvitti niin analyyttisen ajattelutaidon kuin ai-
kapreferenssinkin mahdollisia yhteyksiä neurobiologiseen temperamenttiin (Rawlings, Ta-
pola, & Niemivirta, 2017). Jälkimmäisiä yhteyksiä ei ole tiettävästi aiemmin tutkittu. 
 
Tutkimusaineisto kerättiin Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun 135 ensimmäisen vuoden opiskeli-
jalta. Opiskelijat vastasivat kyselylomakkeeseen internet-linkin kautta. Mallien rakenteellista 
validiteettia tutkittiin eksploratiivisen faktorianalyysin avulla. Mittareiden välisiä korrelaatioita 
tarkasteltiin, ja regressioanalyysin avulla analysoitiin, miten temperamentti ennustaa aikapre-
ferenssiä.  
 
Odotusten vastaisesti yhteyksiä analyyttisen ajattelutaidon ja aikapreferenssin tai 
riskipreferenssin välillä ei löytynyt. Aikapreferenssin ja temperamentin välillä havaittiin kuitenkin 
kiinnostavia yhteyksiä. Tulevaisuudessa olisikin mielenkiintoista tutkia lisää neurobiologisen 
temperamentin mahdollisia vaikutuksia siihen, kuinka suhtaudumme kauempana 
tulevaisuudessa odottaviin ja välittömiin seurauksiin, toisin sanoen, kuinka kaukonäköisiä 
olemme.  
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to look for relationships between analytical thinking skills, two 
selected decision-making characteristics (time preference, risk preference) and temperament. A 
commonly applied test to detect individual differences in analytical thinking is the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which captures important characteristics of rational 
thinking, different from intelligence and other cognitive ability (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). 
If a strong correlation between the ability to analytical thinking and some other types of 
characteristics was found, it would help to identify individuals with good analytical decision-
making skills and to clarify the phenomenon of analytical thinking. 
 
This work continued the exploration of relations between individual differences in analytical 
thinking, assessed as performance in CRT, and selected psychological characteristics: time 
preference and risk preference, where a link has been detected in previous research on 
university students in the U.S. In this study, time preference was assessed as performance in 
the Consideration of Future Consequences Test (CFC-14; Joireman, Shaffer, Balliet, & 
Strathman, 2012). With data gathered from Finnish university students, this study attempted to 
replicate the findings of the original study (Frederick, 2005), where a relationship between the 
CRT and risk preference was detected. The current study extended previous research by 
examining also the relation of analytical thinking skills and neurobiological temperament 
(Rawlings, Tapola & Niemivirta, 2017). The relation of time preference and temperament was 
also studied.  
 
The participants in the present study were 135 first-year students from the National Defence 
University in Finland. The students completed a self-report questionnaire via a weblink. An 
exploratory factor analysis was performed to test the construct validity of the models applied. 
The correlations between the tests were examined and by using standard regression analyses 
the effects of the temperament on the time preference were analysed. 
 
Contrary to expectations, no relation between the CRT score and time preference, risk 
preference or temperament were detected. However, interesting links between time preference 
and temperament were found. Therefore, future research could investigate further how 
neurobiological temperament sets our concerns with future and immediate consequences, that 
is, our farsightedness or the lack of it. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine relationships between skills in analytical (rational) 
thinking and selected psychological characteristics, that were assumed to correlate with 
it. Assessment of decision-making skills, such as analytical thinking, can be important 
for example, when executives and directors are recruited – or students for a special field 
of study are selected. Attempts to develop such tests have been made. However, creat-
ing these tools is a challenge: as soon as the individual tries to solve the test problem or 
is given the correct answer, the problem and answer risk to be memorized.  Tests often 
attract interest from the public, and the test problems become well-known, which makes 
them not effective for continuous use (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). This challenge 
has attracted interest to look for possible relations between analytical thinking skills and 
other psychological characteristics. If a strong correlation between the ability to analytical 
thinking and some other types of characteristics was found, it would be easier to identify 
individuals with good analytical decision-making skills.  
 
What is analytical thinking after all? Rationality, which depicts the ideal model of behav-
iour, is not easy to assess as a subject of study. However, it has long been studied in 
different fields, including philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, economics and 
judgement and decision-making (JDM) (Stanovich, 2009). In JDM the classic standard 
for rationality is utility theory, a cornerstone of modern economics. Utility theory sees 
decision-making as a rational process, purely based on calculating the highest expected 
utility. However, as empirical studies have shown, utility theory does not successfully 
model the human decision-making behaviour in real-life circumstances, not even in the 
simplest situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In re-
sponse to this, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman developed the Nobel prize winning 
prospect theory to explain why so often people are risk averse in the domain of gains, 
but risk-seeking in the domain of losses.  
 
Why did standard economic models of human decision-making fail to explain human 
behaviour? One of the reasons is their rejection of emotions. Even though the study of 
emotions within JDM is relatively young, modern science recognises the importance of 
the emotional system in decision-making (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; LeDoux, 1996; Ler-
ner, Li, Piercarlo, & Kassam, 2015; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). It is from the bases of 
our emotions, that we make the choice to avoid or approach. If our emotional system is 
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not working properly, we fail to make good decisions (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1994). 
Due to our emotions, we also tend to reject unfair offers, even when this is not rational 
behaviour from the perspective of utility theory (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2003). Although emotions are necessary for and inseparable from decision-mak-
ing, sometimes emotions can be misleading. Even though the reliance on heuristics (“gut 
feeling”) might have been an adequate strategy for our hunter-gatherer ancestors, and 
intuitive judgment is still useful in everyday life, many decision-making situations of the 
modern world require a different type of approach. 
 
In cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and other fields studying thinking, two 
types of cognitive processes are often distinguished: thinking can be divided into intuitive 
(heuristic) and analytical (rational). Intuitive thinking is liable to cognitive biases which 
can lead to severe errors of judgment and cause profound consequences. Classic ex-
amples of cognitive biases, mental processes of simplifying complex data, are for exam-
ple anchoring and availability (Kahneman, 2012). Anchoring describes our tendency to 
rely on the first piece of information offered (the “anchor”) when making decisions.  Also, 
we tend to take into consideration only the information available, ignoring that information 
is missing. Are some individuals more analytical in their decision-making than others, 
and some more prone to rely on heuristics? Several studies have detected individual 
differences in these two thinking styles or systems. It is not known, to what extent these 
tendencies are innate, but they are presumed to correlate with other individual differ-
ences, such as cognitive styles.  
 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the relationship between analytical thinking skills 
and two decision-making characteristics: time preference and risk preference. In this 
study, analytical thinking skills are assessed as performance in the Cognitive Reflection 
Test, (CRT; Frederick, 2005), based on dual-process theory described above. An indi-
vidual’s attitude toward future outcomes has long been linked to rationality and decision-
making. This consideration of temporal consequences has been measured with a variety 
of psychometric methods under the title of time preference or temporal discounting.  A 
relation between CRT and time preference has been detected in previous studies, as 
well as a link between CRT score and risk preference, that is, individual differences in 
risk attitude (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). Decision-making is often about decid-
ing whether to approach or avoid, a tendency which can vary according to temperament. 
For that reason, relationship between the ability to analytical thinking and temperament, 
measured as punishment and reward sensitivities (Rawlings, Tapola & Niemivirta, 2017), 
is also studied. The original studies of analytical decision-making skills were conducted 
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on students from prestigious universities such as Harvard, MIT, and Princeton. This 
study is replicated in the higher education context, the participants being students of the 
National Defence University in Finland, where students are selected after a multi-tier 
selection process. 
 
 
2. Analytical and intuitive thinking 
 
2.1. Dual-process theories 
The idea of the mind being composed of different subsystems is nothing new – already 
Plato divided the soul into three agents: reason, spirit, and appetite (Evans & Frankish, 
2009; Stanovich, 2011). The view of a fundamental duality in the human mind developed 
into modern dual-process theories after the cognitive revolution in psychology, during 
the 1960s and 1970s (Evans & Frankish, 2009). The modern dual-process theories di-
vide cognitive processes into intuitive (heuristic) and analytical (rational). Various alter-
native views and terms for the dichotomy have been proposed, for example, Mischel 
distinguishes between hot and cool systems (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Stanovich (1999) introduced the labels System 1 and System 2, which have 
since then become popular. Later Stanovich suggested that Type 1 and Type 2 termi-
nology should be applied, because the term ‘system’ refers to a singular system, while 
processing might result from operations of a variety of subsystems (Stanovich, 2011). 
Evolutionary theorizing, as well as neurophysiological research, have given support for 
the dual-system models. System 1 is assumed to be relatively old from the evolutionary 
perspective and shared with other animals, whereas System 2 is considered as more 
recently evolved and typical to humans (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005).  
 
According to the dualistic theory, people are prone to save energy, making most of our 
thinking automatic (heuristic). We often behave like cognitive misers: we choose the 
quick response or solution that comes to mind instead of suppressing the erroneous 
response and thinking further (Stanovich, 2009; Toplak et al., 2011; Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1974). This Type 1 thinking is unconscious and fast, whereas the deliberative Type 
2 processes are conscious and slow (Evans & Frankish, 2009). Automatic thinking is well 
needed and accurate most of the time (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2012). 
However, the intuitive mind has the tendency to commit thinking errors (cognitive biases; 
Stanovich 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Therefore, when making decisions of un-
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usual importance, ideas produced by System 1 should be analysed by System 2. Nev-
ertheless, contrary to a common misconception, lack of emotions is not an attribute of 
System 2 (Kahneman, 2012). It is nowadays well understood that emotional processes 
are involved in all decision-making (Bechara, 2004; Lerner et al., 2015). 
 
Systematic differences in the tendency to biased thinking exist between individuals (Sta-
novich, 2009). It is not known to what extent the differences are learned or innate. Re-
search has shown that intelligence is only a moderate predictor of rational thinking and 
that some rational thinking skills can be dissociated from intelligence (Stanovich, 2009; 
Stanovich 2011).  Rationality is operationalized extensively in modern cognitive science, 
but none of these operational measures are assessed on common IQ tests (Stanovich, 
2009). Intentions to assess a rationality quotient (RQ) test have been made (Stanovich, 
West & Toplak, 2016).  
 
 
2.2. Cognitive Reflection Test 
To test individual differences in analytical thinking skills, Frederick introduced the Cogni-
tive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). The original CRT consists of three problems 
that first generate an intuitive response, which is incorrect. For example: “A bat and ball 
cost $1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” 
This problem evokes the intuitive answer of 10 cents, the correct answer being 5 cents. 
The CRT measures whether an individual is satisfied with the intuitive response, or if he 
or she will keep searching for a better solution and is then capable of producing the 
correct answer. Frederick analysed the writings in the margins of the answer forms of his 
studies and noticed that the incorrect, intuitive answer was often considered, even 
though it was not chosen as the final solution. When asked about the difficulty of the test 
problems, the respondents not scoring high found them easier than the respondents who 
were capable of solving them. The CRT problems differ from classic insight problems, 
which usually do not trigger an intuitive, incorrect response (Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; 
Toplak et al., 2011). 
 
The CRT was administered to 3,428 respondents in 35 separate studies (Frederick, 
2005). Many of the respondents also took other measures of cognitive ability, such as 
the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT) and the Need for Cognition scale (NFC), and self-
reported their American College Test (ACT) and Scholastic Achievement Test (SAT) 
scores, as well as tests of time preference and risk preference (see 3.1. and 3.2.). The 
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relations of the CRT with these other tests were then examined and showed positive and 
significant correlations. Between CRT score and SAT scores, Frederick (2005) detected 
a correlation of 0.44, and Obrecht, Chapman and Gelman (2009) a correlation of 0.45. 
When the various cognitive measures were correlated with composite indices of deci-
sion-making characteristics formed from the time preference and risk preference items, 
the results showed that the CRT was either the best or the second-best predictor of 
intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty. 
 
Several studies have examined the relation of the CRT and other measures of cognitive 
ability. The findings of different studies show a significant correlation between the per-
formance on the CRT and several cognitive biases, non-superstitious thinking and gen-
eral numeracy (Fernbach, Sloman, Louis, & Shube, 2013; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein 
& Pardo, 2012; Mata, Ferreira & Sherman, 2013; Moritz, Hill, & Donohue, 2013; 
Oechssler, Roide & Schmitz, 2009; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler & Fugelsang, 
2012; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). In contrast, no relation between CRT perfor-
mance and the degree of encounter bias was found (Obrecht, Chapman & Gelman, 
2009), and only little relation between CRT results and the choice of a high-expected-
value gamble was detected (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010).  
 
Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) demonstrated that the CRT was a better predictor of 
rational thinking than the several measures of intelligence and executive functioning (in-
hibition, updating and set shifting; Stanovich, 2011) used in their study. They formed a 
composite variable of 15 separate rational thinking tasks including three executive-func-
tioning tasks, a cognitive ability test (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, WASI), 
heuristics-and-biases tasks, two sets of syllogistic reasoning tasks and thinking disposi-
tions. Thinking dispositions or cognitive styles are measures of the functioning of the 
reflective mind – concerning beliefs, belief structures, attitudes toward forming and 
changing beliefs, and goals (Stanovich, 2011). Thinking dispositions measure individual 
differences in goal management, epistemic values, and epistemic self-regulation: exam-
ples of thinking dispositions include the tendency to seek various points of view before 
coming to a conclusion, the disposition to think extensively about a problem before re-
sponding or the tendency to think about future consequences before taking action. Time 
preference (see 3.1.), a characteristic studied in this thesis, is often considered as a 
thinking disposition (Toplak et al., 2011).  The CRT, consisting of only three items, was 
found to be a better predictor of rational thinking than either measures of intelligence or 
measures of executive functioning (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014). 
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Only a few studies have attempted to examine the relation between performance in the 
CRT and performance in “real-life decisions”. A correlation between CRT scores and 
success in a real-life simulating task was found when managing inventory with a com-
puter program (Narayanan & Moritz, 2015; Moritz, Hill & Donohue, 2013) and in a com-
puter-based banking game (Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, & Rosa-García, 2016). 
 
The original CRT is a three-item test. All three CRT questions (CRT1-CRT3) have ap-
peared frequently in literature and social media, which induces a risk of familiarity. There-
fore, a similar seven-item test, introducing four supplementary questions, was designed 
by Toplak et al. (2014).  For the revised version, problems CRT4 and CRT5 were sup-
plied by Frederick. CRT6 was adapted from Dominowski (1994), and CRT7 was created 
by Toplak and her colleagues. 
 
 
3. Intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty 
 
3.1. Time preference 
The influence of dual-system models extends to cognitive neuroscience, trying to under-
stand the psychological processes of self-control, modulating impulsivity and far-sighted 
behaviour (McClure & Bickel, 2014). A long-standing hypothesis states, that there is a 
link between deliberative control of behaviour and the executive system in the brain, as 
well as between the automatic mode of behavioural control and brain reward areas. Self-
control (delay of gratification, effortful control, willpower, executive control, time prefer-
ence, self-discipline, self-regulation, ego strength) is the idea of effortful regulation of the 
self by the self (Duckworth, 2011). Self-control is related to conscientiousness, a person-
ality trait that includes responsibility, industriousness, and orderliness (Moffitt et al, 
2011). Behavioural studies have revealed, that self-control skills, ability to inhibit impul-
sions, is related to almost all “success in life” (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013; Moffitt 
et al., 2011; Schlam, Wilson, Shoda, Mischel, & Ayduk, 2013). Ability to self-control pre-
dicts for example savings behaviour, income, physical and mental health and lack of 
criminal convictions (Duckworth, 2011).  
 
Self-control, the ability to resist the temptation to immediate reward to receive a larger 
later reward, is often examined under the title of time preference (temporal discounting, 
time discounting, delay discounting). Presumably, the most widely known tests for self-
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control were conducted by Mischel in the 1960s and 1970s, often referred to as the 
“marshmallow tests” (Mischel, 1974). Since then countless studies have found a relation 
between cognitive ability and patience (Benjamin et al., 2013; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005; 
Shoda et al., 1990), and delay discounting has become a standard measure of self-con-
trol. When adults are being tested, no tempting marshmallows are offered for the partic-
ipants, but time preference is measured with psychometric methods (Mazur, 1987; 
McClure & Bickel, 2014; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). Respondents are asked to 
compare rewards of different amounts available at different time delays, and then choose 
their preferred option. For example: “Would you prefer 3400 euros this month or 3800 
euros next month?”; or “Would you prefer 50 euros immediately or 1000 euros in 10 
years?”. Neuroimaging has supported the findings of automatic and deliberative control 
processes produced by behavioural studies, yet it is not completely known how these 
processes relate to neural systems (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; McClure & Bickel, 2014).  
 
It is interesting to examine the relation of rational thinking skills and the ability to control 
impulsivity. The three CRT problems are “easy” in the sense that their solution is easily 
understood when explained (Frederick, 2005). Therefore, it is expected that the difficult-
ness lays in the respondent’s capability to suppress the intuitive, incorrect answer that 
comes into mind impulsively. One of the CRT problems, the bat-and-ball puzzle, was 
adopted from an experiment on cheating (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003), where the results 
revealed that the respondents giving the intuitive answer were less patient than respond-
ents producing the correct answer.  
 
Frederick (2005) did examine the relation between CRT score and time preference, 
measuring whether an individual prefers an immediate reward if proposed with two alter-
natives. The choice between an immediate reward and a larger delayed reward was 
significantly associated with the test score. For instance, the respondents scoring low in 
the CRT were willing to pay significantly more for the overnight shipping of a chosen 
book. However, the relation was not found for all questions, perhaps due to how they 
were formulated, personal preferences affecting on the choices. For choices involving 
longer horizons, temporal preferences were weakly related or unrelated to CRT scores. 
Frederick’s study detected as well, that the respondents scoring high perceived them-
selves to be significantly less impulsive, and, somehow paradoxically, less preoccupied 
with their future than the “low group”. However, the “high group” perceived themselves 
to be more concerned about inflation. Choices between different monetary rewards are 
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problematic because a knowledgeable respondent can take into consideration for exam-
ple interest rates, inflation and the ability to invest (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Do-
noghue, 2002).  
 
Thinking dispositions assess people’s propensities or tendencies that can facilitate re-
flective judgments (Basile & Toplak, 2015). They can be viewed as cognitive styles (Sta-
novich et al., 2016). The Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFC; Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) is a thinking disposition measure, that has been 
associated with better rational thinking performance (Toplak et al., 2007; West, Toplak, 
& Stanovich, 2008) as well as with temporal discounting (Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Span-
genberg, & Schultz, 2008).  The original Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC-
12) is a 12-item scale measuring to what extent individuals consider distant outcomes 
when choosing their present behaviour. When the relation of CFC-12 and four different 
time preference measures were examined, the results showed that the CFC-12 was sig-
nificantly associated with all four measures (Basile & Toplak, 2015). The relation of CFC-
12 and CRT has been examined as well, and a small, but significant correlation detected 
(Toplak et al., 2011, 2014). The CFC-scale has been revised, and the CFC-14 scale 
applied in this study distinguishes between two subscales: concern with future conse-
quences, CFC-Future, and concern with immediate consequences, CFC-Immediate 
(Joireman, Shaffer, Balliet, & Strathman, 2012). Presumably, the CFC-14 has not been 
previously used to detect the relations of CRT and time preference.  
 
 
3.2. Risk preference 
The relations of numeracy to other cognitive skills have been largely researched (Sta-
novich et al., 2016). However, the relation between risk preferences and cognitive ability 
had not been widely studied, which inspired Frederick (2005) to examine the relation of 
risk preference and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) results. Some studies have re-
ported a correlation between cognitive ability and risk preference (Beauchamp, Cesarini, 
& Johannesson, 2017; Benjamin et al., 2013; Burks, Jeffrey, Lorenz, & Aldo, 2009; 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2010), but some others did not detect a correlation 
(Brandstätter & Güth, 2002; Brañas-Garza, Guillen, & Lopez Del Paso, 2008). It is also 
questionable, whether the interpretation of risk attitude can be thought of as a personality 
trait because it is not stable across situations for most individuals (Bromiley & Curley, 
1992). The same person can show different degrees of risk-taking in financial, career, 
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health, safety, ethical, recreational, and social decisions (Figner & Weber, 2011; Hanoch, 
Johnson, & Wilke, 2006; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986).  
 
 According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), people are more willing to take risks to avoid losses, but more prone to avoid risks 
when there is a possibility to achieve sure gains. For example, when asked “would you 
prefer 900 euros for sure OR 90% possibility to win 1000 euros”, most of the respondents 
would choose the sure gain. However, when asked whether you "prefer to lose 900 euros 
for sure OR a 90% possibility to lose 1000 euros”, they would choose the risky option. 
The prospect theory predicts that people underweight outcomes that are merely proba-
ble, and overweight low probabilities. When people are winning, they become risk-
averse, and when they are losing, they become risk-seeking. 
 
A few attempts to study the relationship between risk preference and analytical thinking 
skills has been made. To assess the relation between CRT performance and risk pref-
erence, Frederick (2005) included 18 measures of risk preferences in his questionnaires. 
He documented that the respondents achieving a high CRT score acted opposite to pro-
spect theory. Subjects achieving high scores were more prone to gamble for items in-
volving gains, but less risk-seeking in the domain of losses. Oechssler and his colleagues 
(2009) replicated Frederick’s study to some extent. They applied only two questions and 
divided the respondents into two groups including all the participants, whereas Frederick 
compared the results of the “extreme” achievers, the lowest achievers and the highest 
achievers. For both of the question items, Oechssler et al. found the high CRT group 
preferring slightly more the risky option in the domain of gains but being slightly more 
risk aversive in the domain of losses. With Finnish university students, the present study 
attempts to replicate the findings of original study of Frederick (2015). 
 
 
4. Temperament as punishment and reward sensitivities 
There have been unexpectedly few studies examining the influence of personality traits 
on decision-making biases. Research on the relationship between analytical thinking and 
temperament or personality traits is almost non-existent. This is surprising because, from 
the very beginning of developing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), it has been as-
sumed that success in the test requires an ability to suppress the intuitive answer, that 
is, individuals with high CRT scores would be more patient (Frederick, 2005). Also, a 
correlation between CRT and the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFC-
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12) has been detected (Toplak et al., 2011, 2014), suggesting, that the ability to analytical 
thinking is somehow related to farsightedness. Humans tend to act like cognitive misers, 
relying on Type 1 (heuristic) thinking only, and self-control is needed to induce further 
reflection. Self-control is known to be related to Conscientiousness, a personality trait 
that includes responsibility, industriousness, and orderliness (Moffitt et al., 2011).  
 
In their study, Alós-Ferrer, Garagnani, and Hügelschäfer (2016), explored the possible 
influence of personality factors on both choices and response times in standard ques-
tions from the decision-making literature, including CRT. They applied standard person-
ality scales such as the Big Five (McCrae & Costa, 1987). Their findings showed that the 
differences in response times were as predicted by dual-process theories: the CRT ques-
tions led to faster responses than other type of questions. However, even though per-
sonality trait Conscientiousness led to faster responses and Extraversion to slower ones, 
neither had a significant effect on the correctness of the responses. Agreeableness led 
to significantly more correct answers and Neuroticism and Openness to experience to 
more errors, but none of them had a significant effect on response times (Alós-Ferrer et 
al., 2016). 
 
Temperament and personality can, of course, be studied from various perspectives. In 
this study, temperament is defined as a neurobiological basis of personality that accounts 
for inborn differences in individuals’ typical ways of reacting to environmental stimuli 
(McNaughton & Corr, 2008; Rawlings, Tapola & Niemivirta, 2017). When temperament 
interacts with the environment, relatively stable emotional, motivational and behavioural 
patterns are formed (Rothbart, 2007). In this study, temperament is measured as pun-
ishment and reward sensitivity (Torrubia, César, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001; Rawlings et al, 
2017), when the behavioural reaction to avoid aversive or approach appetitive stimuli is 
stemming from the innate behavioural inhibition (BIS) and behavioural approach system 
(BAS) (Corr, 2008; Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Corr & McNaughton, 2008). BIS is a self-pro-
tective function which detects signals of threatening punishments, whereas BAS is a 
function detecting signals for possible rewards (Carver & White, 1994; Corr, 2008; Corr 
& McNaughton, 2008; Elliot & Thrash, 2002). The BAS is often viewed as a more com-
plex construction than the BIS (Corr, 2008), consisting of several dimensions (Carver & 
White, 1994; Colder et al., 2011). 
 
Not only the sensitivity to punishment and reward, but also the sources of punishment 
and reward may vary from one individual to another (Colder et al., 2011; Rawlings et al., 
2017). In their two sub-studies, Rawlings et al. (2017) observed a four-factor structure of 
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temperamental sensitivities (punishment and reward sensitivities) based on previous lit-
erature and previous empirical research. In their first study, they compiled a scale to 
cover sensitivity to punishment, two reward sensitivity scales reflecting differences in 
sources of intraindividual reward (novelty-seeking and positive expressiveness) and sen-
sitivity to interindividual reward. The punishment sensitivity consists of sensitivity to fail-
ure, shyness, withdrawal and avoidance of difficult or novel situations. The interindividual 
reward sensitivity consists of sensitivity to external rewards, such as attention and praise, 
and seeking to impress others. The intraindividual reward sensitivity scales reflect two 
different sources of rewards: 1) enjoyment and seeking of novelty and 2) a tendency for 
excitement and open expression of positive emotions about personal successes. In their 
second study, the structure was the most part replicated. 
 
Could analytical thinking skills, that is, the tendency to override the intuitive, incorrect 
answer and to engage in further reflection (Toplak et al., 2011), somehow reflect spon-
taneous processing of rewards and punishments? In order to better understand the 
mechanisms of individual differences in analytical thinking, the relation of analytical think-
ing and neurobiological temperament, assessed as punishment and reward sensitivities, 
is investigated in this study.  
 
 
5. Research questions and assumptions 
The main objective of this study was to look for relations between analytical thinking skills 
and selected psychological characteristics. Therefore the links between analytical think-
ing skills (assessed as performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test, CRT, Frederick, 
2005) and individual differences in time preference (assessed as performance in the 
Consideration of Future Consequences Test, CFC; Joireman et al., 2012), risk prefer-
ence (assessed as a questionnaire formerly used by Frederick, 2005) and temperament 
(assessed as sensitivity to punishment and rewards, Rawlings et al., 2017) were ana-
lysed.  
 12 
 
 
Figure 1. Research framework: Relations of CRT, time preference, risk preference and 
temperament. 
 
 
 
This study investigated the following research questions: 
 
a) Is there a relationship between the performances in the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) and in the time preference (CFC-14)?  If a relationship exists, does CFC-
14 score predict CRT score? Based on previous research it was expected, that 
individuals scoring high in CFC-Future should be more likely to gain a higher 
score in the CRT than those scoring low, and those scoring high on CFC-Imme-
diate should be more likely to gain lower score in the CRT. In previous studies 
positive correlations have been detected between CFC-12 and CRT (Toplak et 
al., 2011, 2014). However, Toplak et al. (2014) reported, that CRT was not a very 
good predictor of CFC. 
 
b) Is there a relationship between the performance in the CRT and temperament? 
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If a relationship exists, does temperament predict the CRT score? There has 
been little research examining the link between CRT and temperament or per-
sonality. A link between personality, assessed as the Big Five -personality scale 
(McCrae & Costa, 1987), and CRT has been examined (Alós-Ferrer et al., 2016), 
but the effects were not significant. The link between CRT and neurobiological 
temperament assessed as punishment and reward sensitivities (Rawlings et al., 
2017) has not presumably been previously studied. 
 
c) Is there a relationship between the performance in the CRT and risk preference?  
Based on previous research it was expected, that individuals scoring high in the 
CRT should prefer a risky option in the domain of gains but be more risk aversive 
in the domain of losses (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009). 
 
d) How are the selected psychological characteristics, that is, time preference and 
temperament, related? Is there a link between temperament and the tendency to 
focus on the future or immediate consequences of one’s behaviour? 
 
 
 
6. Method 
 
6.1. Participants and procedure 
The sample used in this study consisted of 135 students (128 males, 7 females, M age 
= 21.55, SD = 1.52), practically representing the entire first-year class of National De-
fence University (NDU) in Finland.  No background variables were available for the study. 
The participation was compulsory for the students. The participants were gathered in an 
auditorium where they completed a self-report questionnaire assessing analytical think-
ing skills, time preference, risk preference and temperament via a web link (Webprobol 
TM). The language used in the questionnaire was Finnish. The respondents were per-
mitted to use a calculator or a mobile phone calculator if needed. They were informed 
that the gathered data will be treated confidentially and anonymously and that their iden-
tity cannot be determined. 
 
The National Defence University provides higher education in the military field and trains 
officers for the Finnish Defence Forces. The students have completed their military ser-
vice, and they are selected after a multi-tier selection process including evaluation of 
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achievement in prior education, achievement in military service, an exam phase contain-
ing a series of psychological and ability tests, and physiological screening. The annual 
intake of the NDU was approximately 140 at the time the data was gathered, and only 
3–6 % of students were female, which is a typical gender distribution for this university.   
 
 
6.2.  Tasks and measures 
To examine the analytical thinking skills, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was taken 
from Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014), and composed of seven problems (e.g. “A bat 
and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost? ____ cents”; see Appendix A). 
 
The test for time preference was adapted from Joireman et al. (2012). The original Con-
sideration of Future Consequences Test (CFC-12) is a unidimensional scale (Strathman 
et al., 1994). However, several studies have argued that a two-factor model, distinguish-
ing between CFC-Future and CFC-Immediate subscales, explains the phenomena more 
efficiently (Joireman, Balliet, & Sprott, 2008; Petrocelli, 2003; Rappange, Brouwer, & van 
Exel, 2009; Toepoel, 2010). Therefore, a revised two-factor CFC-14 scale (Joireman et 
al., 2012) was applied in this study (see Appendix B). The CFC-14 subscales assess 
concern with future consequences (CFC-Future: 7 items, e.g. “Often I engage in a par-
ticular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for many years”) and 
concern with immediate consequences (CFC-Immediate: 7 items, e.g. “I only act to sat-
isfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself”).  
 
The risk preference questionnaire (see Appendix C) was adapted from Frederick (2005) 
and consists of three categories of questions: 1. a certain gain versus a higher expected 
value (e.g. “1000 for sure or a 90% chance of 5000”); 2. a certain gain versus a lower 
expected value (e.g. “100 for sure or a 25% chance of 200”); 3. a certain loss versus a 
lower expected value (e.g. “lose 10 for sure or a 90% chance to lose 50”). 
 
The scale for temperament was adapted from Rawlings, Tapola and Niemivirta (2017) 
and composed of four scales: a scale to cover Sensitivity to punishment (5 items; e.g. “I 
get upset easily if I am criticized or told off”), a scale to cover Intraindividual reward sen-
sitivity – positive expressiveness (2 items; e.g. “I express my excitement and enjoyment 
openly, when I succeed at something”), a scale to cover Intraindividual reward sensitivity 
– novelty-seeking (3 items; e.g. “I will readily seek out novel situations”), and a scale to 
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cover external, Interindividual reward sensitivity (4 items; e.g. “I sometimes act hastily 
just to get an immediate reward or praise”; see Appendix D). 
 
All scales were translated into Finnish. Items for CFC-14 and for temperament were 
mixed in the questionnaire. Responses to both scales were given on a seven-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). 
 
 
6.3.  Analyses 
The statistical analyses were conducted by IBM SPSS version 23. The preliminary anal-
yses consisted of examining the answers given in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). 
An exploratory factor analysis was performed to test the construct validity of both of the 
models applied: Consideration of Future Consequences Test (CFC-14 model) and the 
temperament scales. Based on the results from the factor analyses, composite variables 
were constructed and Cronbach’s alpha values were calculated to evaluate the variables’ 
internal consistency and reliability (Field, 2015). The correlations between the three dif-
ferent scales were examined and standard regression analyses were performed to ana-
lyse the effect of the temperament on the CFC. Finally, the relationship between CRT 
scores and risk preference was examined with the cross-tabulation and Pearson chi-
square tests. 
 
 
7. Results  
 
7.1. Preliminary analyses 
7.1.1. CRT 
Before proceeding to further analyses, the results from the CRT were analysed. The CRT 
consists of seven questions, CRT1-CRT7. The answers given in the CRT consist of three 
different categories: correct answer, intuitive (incorrect) answer and others (incorrect, but 
other than the intuitive) answer. Distribution of correct, intuitive and other answers are 
shown in table 1. 
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Table 1. 
Distribution of answers per question.  
(N = 135) 
 correct  
% 
intuitive 
% 
other 
 % 
CRT1 55.6  37.8 6.7 
CRT2 57.8 34.8 7.4 
CRT3 71.9 21.5 6.7 
CRT4 63.7 17.8 18.5 
CRT5 45.2 43 11.9 
CRT6 40.7 44.4 14.8 
CRT7 82.2 11.1 6.7 
 
 
Next, the distribution of CRT scores was calculated. The participants scored 0-7 points, 
receiving one point per correct answer. In this study, five participants (3.7%) scored 0 
points, whereas 18 participants (13.3%) scored 7 points. Table 2 shows the distribution 
of CRT scores. Similarly, the participants were given one point per each intuitive answer, 
and an “intuitive score” (CRT_int) was calculated. As table 3 shows, only one participant 
gave the intuitive, incorrect answer for each of the seven CRT questions. 29 respondents 
(21.5%) gave none intuitive, incorrect answers. The descriptive statistics of the variables 
CRT and CRT_int were examined as well. Both variables were found to be distributed to 
an acceptable level, even though both exhibit some skewness (CRT: skewness -0.359, 
kurtosis -0.939; CRT_int: skewness 0.628, kurtosis -0.504), as shown in table 6. 
 
Table 2. 
Distribution of CRT scores (CRT). (N = 135)  
Score Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 5 3.7 3.7 
1 14 10.4 14.1 
2 13 9.6 23.7 
3 17 12.6 36.3 
4 18 13.3 49.6 
5 26 19.3 68.9 
6 24 17.8 86.7 
7 18 13.3 100.0 
Total 135 100.0  
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Table 3. 
Distribution of “intuitive scores” (CRT_int).  
(N = 135) 
Score Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
0 29 21.5 21.5 
1 34 25.2 46.7 
2 21 15.6 62.2 
3 20 14.8 77.0 
4 14 10.4 87.4 
5 11 8.1 95.6 
6 5 3.7 99.3 
7 1 0.7 100.0 
Total 135 100.0  
 
 
 
 
7.1.2. Exploratory factor analyses 
7.1.2.1. Consideration of Future Consequences 
To examine the construct validity of the CFC-14 model (Joireman et al., 2012), an ex-
ploratory factor analysis was performed using Principal Axis Factoring with Direct Obli-
min rotation. The following four items with communalities below 0.2 were removed:  “I 
generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems 
will be resolved before they reach crisis level” (communality 0.195); “I think it is more 
important to perform a behaviour with important distant consequences than a behaviour 
with less-important immediate consequences”  (0.197); “I think that sacrificing now is 
usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at a later time” (0.199); “I 
only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems 
that may occur at a later date” (0.184). 
 
The analysis showed two factors with eigenvalues greater than one (3.627, 1.697). The 
first factor corresponds to CFC-Future (CFC-F) (36.3% of the variance) and the second 
factor to CFC-Immediate (CFC-I) (17% of the variance), accounting for 61.5% of the total 
variance. The two-factor model was supported also by the scree test. There were no 
cross-loadings (see table 4). 
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Table 4.  
 
Factor loadings of the CFC 
              Factors 
      1    2 
CFC-Future   
When I make a decision, I think about how it might affect me in the 
future. 
 
0.80  
I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those 
things with my day to day behaviour.  
 
0.67  
Often I engage in a particular behaviour in order to achieve outcomes 
that may not result for many years.  
 
0.67  
My behaviour is generally influenced by future consequences.  
 
0.62  
I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seri-
ously even if the negative outcome will not occur for many years. 
 
0.51  
I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in or-
der to achieve future outcomes. 
0.42  
   
CFC-Immediate   
I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take 
care of itself. 
 
 0.75 
Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important 
to me than behaviour that has distant outcomes. 
 
 0.62 
My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions 
I take. 
 
 0.56 
My behaviour is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of 
days or weeks) outcomes of my actions. 
 0.41 
 
 
 
7.1.2.2. Temperament 
To examine the construct validity of the temperament scales (Rawlings et al., 2017), 
again an exploratory factor analysis was performed using Principal Axis Factoring with 
Direct Oblimin rotation. The following items with communalities below 0.2 were removed:  
“I always try to get things or assignments done as quickly as possible” (0.117) and “I like 
activities or assignments where you can get positive feedback quickly and easily” 
(0.103). As well item “I often leave things undone just because I fear I will fail” was re-
moved due to consistency with previous studies.  
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The analysis showed four factors with eigenvalues greater than one (4.479, 2.145, 1.424, 
1.015), as shown in table 5. The first factor corresponds to Sensitivity to punishment 
(32% of the variance), the second factor to Intraindividual reward sensitivity – positive 
expressiveness (15.3% of the variance), the third factor to Interindividual reward sensi-
tivity (10.2% of the variance) and the fourth factor to Intraindividual reward sensitivity – 
novelty-seeking (7.3% of the variance), accounting for 64.7% of the total variance. One 
item, “I will gladly be the centre of attention”, cross-loaded onto three factors. It was 
included in the Interindividual reward sensitivity-factor, where it loaded with the highest 
value (0.39). 
 
 
Table 5.  
Factor loadings of the temperament scales 
                                         Factors 
      1     2     3     4 
Sensitivity to punishment SP 
 
     
I am easily shy in the company of people I don’t 
know and in new situations. 
 -.97    
I feel very uncomfortable in new situations and 
places. 
 -.76    
I avoid talking or performing in public (e.g., at 
lectures).  
 -.59    
I withdraw easily in difficult or awkward situa-
tions. 
 -.57    
I get upset if I am criticised or told off.  -.38    
      
Intraindividual reward sensitivity – positive 
expressiveness SRiPE 
 
     
I express my excitement and enjoyment openly, 
when I succeed at something. 
  0.99   
I don’t hold back my joy and enthusiasm when 
something nice happens to me. 
 
  0.70   
Interindividual reward sensitivity SRe 
 
     
I sometimes act hastily just to get an immediate 
reward or praise. 
   0.65  
I often do things just to be praised.    0.65  
I will gladly be the centre of attention.  0.31 0.32 0.39  
I often aim to impress other people.    0.35  
      
Intraindividual reward sensitivity – novelty-
seeking SRiNS 
 
     
I will readily seek out novel situations.     0.78 
I think it is exciting to get into new and surprising 
situations. 
    0.77 
I get excited about new things easily.     0.53 
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7.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Based on the solutions from the factor analyses, composite variables were constructed. 
After creating composite scores, their normal distribution was examined and their internal 
consistency and reliability evaluated by calculating Cronbach’s alpha values. The 
Cronbach’s alphas were good/acceptable except for the factor Interindividual reward 
sensitivity (SRe). For SRe the alpha level was only .56, which must be taken into account 
when interpreting the results. The data was found to be suitable for parametric analyses. 
Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alpha values are shown in table 6.  
 
Table 6. 
Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas 
Variable (N = 135) M SD Alpha Skewness Kurtosis 
 
CRT (7 items) 
 
4.17 
 
2.04 
 
n/a 
 
-0.359 
 
-0.939 
 
CRT_int (7 items) 
 
2.1 
 
1.79 
 
n/a 
 
0.628 
 
-0.504 
 
CFC-F (6 items) 
 
5.24 
 
0.80 
 
0.79 
 
-0.153 
 
0.162 
 
CFC-I (4 items) 
 
2.94 
 
0.91 
 
0.69 
 
0.266 
 
-0.242 
 
SP (5 items) 
 
2.30 
 
0.95 
 
0.80 
 
1.036 
 
1.241 
 
SRiPE (2 items) 
 
5.03 
 
1.12 
 
0.82 
 
-0.557 
 
0.288 
 
SRe (4 items) 
 
3.29 
 
0.79 
 
0.56 
 
0.026 
 
-0.328 
 
SRiNS (3 items) 
 
5.33 
 
0.94 
 
0.77 
 
-0.372 
 
0.245 
 
 
After constructing the composite scores for all variables shown in table 6, their correla-
tions were examined with Pearson’s correlation. CRT results did not show a considerable 
correlation with CFC or temperament. Negative correlations were found between Sensi-
tivity to punishment (SP) and CFC-F (r= -.19), whereas Interindividual reward sensitivity 
SRe) and CFC-F (r= .22), and Intraindividual reward sensitivity – novelty-seeking 
(SRiNS) and CFC-F (r= .41) correlated positively.  CFC-I correlated positively with Sen-
sitivity to punishment (SP) (r= .41) and Interindividual reward sensitivity (SRe) (r= .27), 
and negatively with Intraindividual reward sensitivity – novelty-seeking (SRiNS) (r= -.20). 
All the correlations are shown in table 7. 
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Table 7. 
Correlations between CRT scores, CFC and temperament 
          
CRT 
   
CRT_int 
      
CFC-F 
       
CFC-I 
             
SP 
     
SRiPE 
        
SRe 
   
SRiNS 
CRT 
1        
CRT_int 
-.89** 1       
CFC-F 
.04 -.04 1      
CFC-I 
-.05 .08 -.35** 1     
SP 
.07 -.08 -.19* .41** 1    
SRiPE 
-.06 .15 .15 .05 -.19* 1   
SRe 
 .01 -.05 .22
** .27** -.10 0.28** 1  
SRiNS 
-.01 .05 .41** -.20* -.49** 0.39 0.22* 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
7.3. Temperament as a predictor of time preference 
No correlations were found between the CRT performance and the other scales meas-
ured, but the temperament and time preference showed some significant correlations. 
Therefore, a multiple linear regression was calculated to predict the CFC-F and CFC-I 
from temperament. The results are shown in table 8.  
 
For CFC-F, a significant regression equation was found (F (4,130) = 7.481, p < 0.001), 
with a R² of 0.187. Participant’s predicted CFC-F score is equal to 3.010 – 0.029 (SRiPE) 
+ 0.344 (SRiNS) + 0.153 (SRe) + 0.016 (SP), where only Intraindividual reward sensitiv-
ity – novelty-seeking (SRiNS) was a significant predictor.  
 
For CFC-I, also a significant regression equation was found (F (4,130) = 12.421, p < 
0.001), with a R² of 0.277. Participant’s predicted CFC-I score is equal to 1.067 – 0.096 
(SRiNS) + 0.360 (SRe) + 0.389 (SP) + 0.062 (SRiPE), where Interindividual reward sen-
sitivity (SRe) and Sensitivity to punishment (SP) were significant predictors.  
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Table 8. 
           Regression of CFC on temperament 
 SP SRiNS SRe SRiPE 
 Beta   t Sig. Beta  t Sig. Beta  t Sig. Beta  t Sig. 
CFC-F 0.019 0.208 0.835 0.400 4.106 0.000 0.149 1.800 0.074 -0.041 -0.461 0.646 
CFC-I 0.406 4.737 0.000 -0.099 -1.078 0.283 0.313 3.998 0.000 0.076 0.919 0.360 
 
 
 
7.4. Risk preference analysis 
Before analysing the relation between the CRT results and risk preference, the partici-
pants were grouped by their CRT scores. To simplify the analysis without affecting the 
conclusions, previous studies (Frederick 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009) have made a 
comparison between the lowest achieving group and the highest achieving group. Fred-
erick (N = 3,428) applied a 3-item test and compared the results of the lowest performers 
(scoring 0 out of 3) with the highest performing group (scoring 3 out of 3). In this study 
(N = 135) a 7-item test was applied and therefore the groups were formed differently: 
“low group” consisted of 23.7% of the respondents, scoring 0, 1 or 2 out of 7. The “high 
group” consisted of 31.1%, scoring 6 or 7. 
 
The relationship between CRT scores and risk preference was examined with the cross-
tabulation and Pearson chi-square tests. Table 9 shows the risk-seeking behaviour 
among the two CRT groups (High/Low), the presentation being similar to Frederick’s. 
The table shows the percentage of each group choosing the riskier option. For example, 
for the first item “1000€ for sure or a 90 % chance of 5000€”, 71,9% from the “low group” 
and 81% from the “high group” chose the riskier option. For each item the higher per-
centage is highlighted in the table 9, as well as the probability values that are statistically 
significant or approaching significance. 
 
Only a few of the results were significant. In the domain of certain gains versus higher 
expected value gambles, for two items the “low group” was more willing to gamble than 
the “high group”, the other item being statistically significant (p < 0.05). For the rest of 
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the items the “high group” was more willing to gamble, only one of the results approach-
ing significance. In the domain of certain gains versus lower expected value gambles, 
the “low group” was more willing to gamble for each item, but none of the results were 
significant. 
  
For items involving losses, the “low group” was more willing to gamble for 4 out of 5 
items. One of these results was statistically significant (p < 0.05). For one item the “high 
group” was more willing to gamble, and the result was statistically significant as well (p 
< 0.05).  
 
Table 9.  
Risk-seeking behaviour among low and high CRT groups 
 
  
Percentage choosing the riskier option 
  
                 CRT group 
 
  
Certain gains vs. Higher expected value gambles 
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Stat.Sig-
nif. 
 
1 
 
1000€ for sure or a 90 % chance of 5000€ 
  
71.9% 
 
81% 
 
0.495 
 
2 
 
100€ for sure or a 90 % chance of 500€ 
  
84.4% 
 
78.6% 
 
0.015 
 
3 
 
1000€ for sure or a 75 % chance of 4000€ 
  
34.4% 
 
54.8% 
 
0.216 
 
4 
 
100€ for sure or a 75 % chance of 200€ 
  
46.9% 
 
45.2% 
 
0.919 
 
5 
 
100€ for sure or a 75 % chance of 150€ 
  
15.6% 
 
26.2% 
 
0.087 
 
6 
 
100€ for sure or a 50 % chance of 300€ 
  
12.5% 
 
28.6% 
 
0.249 
 
7 
 
500€ for sure or a 15 % chance of 1 000 000€ 
  
78.1% 
 
88.1% 
 
0.344 
 
8 
 
100€ for sure or a 3 % chance of 7 000€ 
  
9.4% 
 
21.4% 
 
 
0.309 
  
Certain gains vs. Lower expected value gambles 
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Stat.Sig-
nif. 
 
9 
 
100€ for sure or a 25 % chance of 200€ 
  
3.1% 
 
2.4% 
 
0.964 
 
10 
 
100€ for sure or a 25 % chance of 300€ 
  
6.3% 
 
4.8% 
 
0.952 
 
11 
 
5€ for sure or a 4 % chance of 80€ 
  
53.1% 
 
31% 
 
0.157 
 
12 
 
5€ for sure or a 1 % chance of 80€ 
  
25% 
 
14.3% 
 
0.491 
 
13 
 
60€ for sure or a 1 % chance of 5000€ 
  
21.9% 
 
14.3% 
 
 
0.673 
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Certain losses vs. Lower expected value gambles 
 
Low 
 
High 
Stat.Sig-
nif. 
 
14 
 
Lose 10€ for sure or a 90 % chance to lose 50€ 
  
9.4% 
 
16.7% 
 
0.022 
 
15 
 
Lose 100€ for sure or a 75 % chance to lose 200€ 
  
28.1% 
 
16.7% 
 
0.127 
 
16 
 
Lose 100€ for sure or a 50 % chance to lose 300€ 
  
40.6% 
 
21.4% 
 
0.202 
 
17 
 
Lose 50€ for sure or a 10 % chance to lose 800€ 
  
56.3% 
 
42.9% 
 
0.517 
 
18 
 
Lose 100€ for sure or a 3 % chance to lose 7000€ 
  
68.8% 
 
42.9% 
 
0.046 
 
 
 
8. Discussion  
The aim of the study was to look for links between analytical thinking skills, assessed as 
performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and some psychological character-
istics that were assumed to correlate with it: time preference, risk preference, and tem-
perament.  
 
The preliminary results showed some variation in the difficulty of the CRT problems: 
82.2% got CRT7 correct, and the second most easy question item was CRT3, which 
71.9% got correct. CRT7 is differently formulated from the other test questions: the par-
ticipant is asked to choose between three options (a, b and c), whereas all the other 
items are open-ended questions. CRT6 provoked the highest number of intuitive an-
swers, 44.4%, the second being CRT5 with 43%. When the CRT scores were examined, 
13.3% (N = 135) scored 7 points, and 17.8%  scored 6 points. 21.5% did not choose the 
intuitive answer at all, and 25.2% chose it once.  
 
In the original study of Frederick (2005), a large number of university students tested at 
Harvard, MIT and Princeton gave the intuitive answer for the bat-and-ball puzzle (CRT1) 
(Toplak et al., 2011). In another study, 85.6% of the participants from a large university 
gave the intuitive response for the CRT1 (Toplak et al, 2014). In this study, only 37.8% 
of the participants gave the intuitive answer for CRT1.  
 
Also, in their earlier study (2011), Toplak and her colleagues reported 55.8% (N = 193) 
of the participants not solving any of the problems, and 6.6% solving all three items. In 
Frederick’s study, 7% of the respondents from MIT scored 0, that is, did not solve any of 
the problems, and 48% scored 3, that is, solved all three problems. In the same study, 
18% (N = 121) of the respondents from Princeton scored 0, and 26% scored 3. The 
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students from Harvard didn’t do any better, 20% (N = 51) scored 0 whereas another 20% 
scored 3. In this study, only 3.7% (N = 135) scored 0 points. 13.3% of the Finnish partic-
ipants solved all seven problems, and 17.8% solved six problems. Are the students of 
the Finnish National Defence University (NDU) less prone to act like cognitive misers 
than the students of the most prestigious universities in the U.S.?  
 
There is a risk that the participants in this study were familiar with the original CRT prob-
lems (items CRT1-CRT3) or the objective of the test, because the test has attracted 
some publicity in the media during the years. It is also unknown how the selection pro-
cesses of the universities differ, the selection process of the NDU being a multi-tier pro-
cess including several different assessments. It is not known either, if the military training 
the students have received improves or encourages analytical thinking. 
 
The gender distribution might offer an explanation for the difference in the results be-
tween the universities.  The current data consisted of almost male participants only (128 
males, 7 females). In his original study, Frederick (2005) showed that the test has a 
(male) gender bias: men score significantly higher than women, and women seem to 
make the intuitive mistake more often. Toplak et al. (2014) replicated Frederick’s find-
ings: there was a significantly better performance by males for both the original 3-item 
CRT as well as for the four new CRT-items introduced in their study. 
 
 
8.1. Relations of the CRT with time preference and temperament 
In previous studies, a relation between Cognitive Reflection Test performance and time 
preference has been documented (Frederick, 2015; Oechssler et al., 2009; Toplak et al., 
2011, 2014). When proposed two alternatives, hypothetical choices between different 
amounts of money, the participants scoring higher in the CRT were found to be generally 
more “patient” (Frederick, 2005). Also, the same study revealed, that the high CRT group 
perceived themselves to be significantly less impulsive and more concerned about infla-
tions than the “low group”. However, ambiguously, the “high group” was less preoccupied 
with their future.  
 
When the Consideration of Future Consequences scale was applied, CFC-12 and CRT 
showed a small, but significant correlation of 0.10 (Toplak et al., 2011). In their later study 
(2014), Toplak and her colleagues detected a correlation of 0.3 between CFC-12 and 
the new 7-item CRT, and a correlation of 0.21 between CFC-12 and the original 3-item 
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CRT. However, their regression analyses showed, that the 7-item CRT was not a very 
good predictor of time preference, explaining only 10% of the variance.  
 
In this study, a revised CFC-14 scale (Joireman et al., 2012) was applied to measure the 
time preference. The CFC loaded onto two factors as expected, corresponding to CFC-
Future (CFC-F) and CFC-Immediate (CFC-I). It was expected that individuals scoring 
high in CFC-Future should be more likely to gain a higher score in the CRT than those 
scoring low, and those scoring high on CFC-Immediate should be more likely to gain 
lower score in the CRT. The results did not support the research hypothesis. No corre-
lation between CRT performance and CFC was found.  
 
Also, the possible relation of CRT performance and temperament, assessed as punish-
ment and reward sensitivities (Rawlings et al., 2017) was examined. The temperament 
loaded on four factors, corresponding to Sensitivity to punishment, Intraindividual reward 
sensitivity – positive expressiveness, Interindividual reward sensitivity and Intraindividual 
reward sensitivity – novelty-seeking. No correlation between CRT performance and tem-
perament was found.  
 
 
8.2. Relations of the CRT and risk preference 
One of the research questions was: Are performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test 
and risk preference related? The prospect theory predicts, that people are more willing 
to take risks to avoid losses than to achieve gains, that is, more willing to gamble in the 
domain of losses and less willing to gamble in the domain of gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In a previous study (Frederick, 2005) this was found 
to be true for the low CRT group, but not for the high CRT group.  
 
Frederick’s study detected, that the “high group” was more willing to gamble in the do-
main of gains, even when the gamble did not have a higher expected value and their 
choice, therefore, was less “rational”. In this present study, in the domain of higher ex-
pected value gambles, the “high group” did show a stronger willingness to gamble in six 
out of eight items, but none of these results were significant, only one item approaching 
significance. Respectively for one item of the same category, the “low group” was more 
willing to gamble than the “high group”, and the result was significant.  
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In the domain of certain gains versus lower expected value gambles none of the results 
were significant in this present study, nor in Frederick’s study. In the current study, the 
“low group” showed a higher willingness to gamble for all the items, opposing Frederick’s 
findings, where the “high group” was more willing to gamble for each item. In the domain 
of certain losses versus lower expected value gambles, the “low group” was more willing 
to gamble for 4 out of 5 items, corresponding to the results of the previous study (Fred-
erick, 2005) where the “low group” was found to be more risk-seeking in the domain of 
losses. However, only one of the results was statistically significant, this being the item 
for which the “high group” was more willing to gamble than the “low group”, making 
though a less rational choice.  
 
Because of the lack of significant results, no conclusions for the risk preference of either 
group can be drawn from the results of this study, and the attempt to replicate results 
from earlier research failed. It is worth noticing, that the CRT groups were formed differ-
ently from prior research due to different version of CRT (3 items versus 7 items). A 
comparison only between the very lowest achievers (0 points) and the very highest 
achievers (7 points) would not have been fruitful due to low numerus (N = 135). Therefore 
the “low group” was formed from respondents scoring 0, 1 or 2 out of 7, and the “high 
group” from respondents scoring 6 or 7. 
 
It is worth considering to what extent the correlation between cognitive ability and risk-
taking is related to the ability to calculate the expected value. When monetary choices 
are offered, the respondent’s knowledge about for example interest rates and inflation 
can have an affect on the choices (Frederick et al., 2002). The “high group” of this study 
was more prone to choose the option giving the higher expected value, that is, to make 
a more “rational” choice, in 15 of 18 items. In the original study of Frederick, the “high 
group” made the “rational” choice more often than the “low group”, in 13 out of 18 items. 
The participants had the opportunity to use a calculator, which could have affected the 
results, even though the calculations of expected value are relatively easy. It is unknown, 
if calculators were available in the original studies. However, no conclusions can be 
drawn due to the lack of statistical significance. If only significant results and results ap-
proaching significance are taken into consideration, in the current study the “high group” 
was acting more “rationally” in two items and the “low group” made the more “rational” 
choice twice as well. 
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8.3. Relations of time preference and temperament  
Several studies have examined relationships between the Consideration of Future Con-
sequences (CFC-12; CFC-14) and health behaviour, for example, the habit of exercising 
(Adams & Nettle, 2009), limiting sun exposure (Heckman, Wilson, & Ingersoll, 2009) and 
the use of a condom (Appleby et al., 2005). A high level of CFC-Immediate seems to 
make an individual susceptible to self-control failure, whereas a high level of CFC-Future 
can buffer one against self-control failure (Joireman et al., 2008). People scoring high on 
the CFC-Future scale tend to adopt promotion orientation, whereas those scoring high 
on the CFC-Immediate tend to adopt a prevent orientation. People focusing on the future 
consequences should be more likely to adopt ideal self-goals (hopes, aspirations) and 
strive toward an abstract future goal. In contrast, people focusing on the immediate con-
sequences of their actions should be more likely to adopt ought self-goals (duties and 
responsibilities), which also are more concrete and proximal. High CFC-Future predicts 
the tendency to seek larger, uncertain outcomes over smaller, certain outcomes 
(Joireman & Balliet, 2012) whereas high CFC-Immediate predicts the tendency to seek 
smaller, immediate outcomes over larger, delayed outcomes (Joireman et al., 2008).  
 
One of the research questions was how are time preference and temperament related? 
Is there a link between temperament and the tendency to focus on the future or immedi-
ate consequences of one’s behaviour? A weak, negative correlation between CFC-Fu-
ture and Sensitivity to punishment was detected, whereas a moderate positive correla-
tion between CFC-Immediate and Sensitivity to punishment (SP). Perhaps this indicates 
that an individual, who is trying to achieve a long-term goal, cannot be very concerned 
about how other people will see him or her in the forthcoming situations or “worry too 
much about the future” in general. The SP-scale consists of questions such as “I feel 
very uncomfortable in new situations and places” and “I get upset if I am criticised or told 
off”. Possibly a strong orientation in the future indicates that the individual is determined 
in aiming goals, more than having a distressed attitude towards the future. 
 
CFC-Future correlated positively with Intraindividual reward sensitivity – novelty-seeking 
(SRiNS), where the correlation was found moderate, and with Interindividual reward sen-
sitivity (SRe), where the correlation was weak. It should be kept in mind, that the reliability 
for the Interindividual reward sensitivity (SRe) was low (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.56). Intra-
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individual reward sensitivity – novelty seeking (SRiNS) was found to be a significant pre-
dictor of CFC-Future. It is, of course, easy to understand, that an individual who is keen 
to seek out novel situations and is excited about new things easily, has his or her 
thoughts in the future. Usually it is the future, that will bring new and exciting things, not 
so much your past.  
 
CFC-Immediate correlated positively with Interindividual reward sensitivity (SRe) and 
negatively with Intraindividual reward sensitivity – novelty-seeking (SRiNS), both corre-
lations were weak. One of items in SRe was “I sometimes act hastily just to get an im-
mediate reward or praise”, and the correlation with novelty-seeking (SRiNS) was nega-
tive. Both findings are congruent with the attitude of valuing immediate satisfaction. Both 
Interindividual reward sensitivity (SRe) and Sensitivity to punishment (SP) were signifi-
cant predictors of CFC-Immediate.  
 
The findings were in line with previous research which states that people scoring high on 
the CFC-Future scale tend to adopt a promotion orientation, whereas those scoring high 
on the CFC-Immediate scale will tend to adopt a prevent orientation (Joireman et al., 
2012).  
 
 
8.4. Reliability and validity 
The phenomena detected in previous studies were not replicated in this study and no 
relation between the CRT result and time preference or risk preference was found. This 
can be due to the relatively low numerus (N = 135), but also the differences in gender 
distribution, as discussed earlier in this chapter, need to be taken into consideration (128 
males; 7 females).   
 
The data was gathered from a university where the participation for the study was com-
pulsory. The questionnaires were answered in Finnish, the mother tongue of all or most 
of the students. The participants identities were kept anonymous, and they cannot be 
identified when reading the present study. The research material has been handled se-
curely, and the data will be stored in the National Defence University in Finland only. 
After publishing this study, all other data will be deleted.  
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The measurement scales CRT and CFC-14 have been used in numerous previous pub-
lished studies. Different versions of the CFC-scale have been used in at least 125 pub-
lications (Joireman & King, 2016). It is also worth noting, that the respondents were stu-
dents from a selective university. Therefore, the distribution of the success in the CRT, 
in particular, could have been different if the groups were formed from the general pop-
ulation. 
 
  
8.5. Limitations and suggestions for further studies 
Before closing, some limitations of the present study and suggestions for future studies 
will be considered. This study has several limitations. First, the number of participants 
could have been larger. Second, gender distribution could have been more equal. It 
would have been interesting to gather a sample from other universities in Finland, where 
the number of female students is higher. This would have enabled a better generalization 
of the results, a comparison between the sexes, and perhaps some relations would have 
been detected. Also, perhaps, this would have enabled a comparison between countries 
in the adult education context. However, for a masters’ thesis, the data gathered was 
adequate.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the evidence reported in this study indicates that there 
is a relation between time preference, assessed as Consideration of Future Conse-
quences (CFC-14) and neurological temperament, assessed as punishment and reward 
sensitivities. Future research with larger datasets could contribute to obtain a clearer 
picture of their possible links. Also, more research on the influence of temperament on 
decision-making and thinking styles is needed. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
This study was not successful in replicating the results from previous studies, where a 
relation between the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) score and time preference, as well 
as risk preference, has been detected. Compared to many previous studies, in this study 
the data gathered was smaller, and gender distribution was different. Frederick (2005) 
found a considerable difference between men and women in CRT results. Men scored 
significantly higher than women on the CRT, even when SAT math scores were con-
trolled. Women seemed to make the intuitive mistake more often, whereas the men made 
a wider variety of errors. In this study, it was not possible to make a comparison between 
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the sexes because only seven out of 135 participants were female. However, the gender 
distribution is a potential explanation for the reason why the students at the Finnish Na-
tional Defence University seemed to be less prone to give intuitive, incorrect answers, 
than the students at prestigious universities in the U.S. 
 
The CRT is no more the only available test of analytical thinking. At the end of the year 
2016, Stanovich, West, and Toplak presented the first prototype for the Comprehensive 
Assessment of Rational Thinking (CART), which is designed to detect individual’s Ra-
tionality Quotient (RQ). Unfortunately, their test was not yet available at the time the data 
for this research was gathered. The CART is a compilation of carefully selected subtests, 
for example, tests of probabilistic and statistical reasoning, argument evaluation, rational 
temporal discounting, sensitivity to expected value, risk knowledge, rejection of supersti-
tious thinking and rejection of conspiracy beliefs (Stanovich et al., 2016). Therefore, it 
will still be tempting to continue to apply a much simpler test, such as the standard CRT. 
 
One of the reasons for the interest of developing new tests for rational or analytical think-
ing is the ongoing discussion assuming that the psychometric value of the Cognitive Re-
flection Test necessarily declines with time. The CRT has become popular, the solutions 
are available online and even videos explaining how to solve the problems can be 
watched in YouTube. Perhaps the concerns have been exaggerated. Meyer and his col-
leagues examined 14,053 subjects who took the test up to 25 times (Meyer, Zhou, & 
Frederick, 2018). Their findings showed, that on average, respondents got only 0.024 
additional items correct per exposure, and this small increase was driven entirely by the 
minority of subjects who continued to spend time reflecting on the items.  
 
On top of this, the focus of studying and testing analytical thinking skills has been in 
detecting individual differences. There has been insufficient interest in the improvement 
of analytical thinking skills. Even if individual differences in the domain are related to 
psychological characteristics and are innate to some extent, the effort should be put on 
teaching and learning rational of thinking. Becoming aware of different heuristics and 
cognitive biases will certainly improve an individual’s chances to make good decisions. 
It is believed, that people can become better thinkers (Evans & Frankish, 2009) and 
especially the skills to evaluate risks and probabilities should be thought at a young age 
(Gigerenzer, 2013). It would be interesting to apply these tests to evaluate the efficiency 
of teaching analytical thinking skills, especially in the adult education context among uni-
versity students. This would not only benefit the students but could also lead to a better 
understanding of the mechanisms of analytical thinking.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)  
Frederick (2005): 
 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? ____ cents [Correct answer 5 cents; intuitive an-
swer 10 cents]  
 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes [Correct answer 5 minutes; intui-
tive answer 100 minutes]  
 
 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for 
the patch to cover half of the lake? ____ days [Correct answer 47 days; intuitive 
answer 24 days]  
 
 
Toplak, West & Stanovich (2014): 
 
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of 
water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water to-
gether? _____ days [correct answer 4 days; intuitive answer 9]  
 
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How 
many students are in the class? ______ students [correct answer 29 students; 
intuitive answer 30]  
 
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally 
for $90. How much has he made? _____ dollars [correct answer $20; intuitive 
answer $10]  
 
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six 
months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 
50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had pur-
chased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock mar-
ket, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money [correct answer c, be-
cause the value at this point is $7,000; intuitive response b]. 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Questionnaire 
Joireman et al. (2012): 
 
CFC-Future 
1. When I make a decision, I think about how it might affect me in the future. 
 42 
 
2. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things 
with my day to day behavior.  
3. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may 
not result for many years. 
4. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to 
achieve future outcomes. 
5. I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if 
the negative outcome will not occur for many years. 
6. I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant conse-
quences than a behavior with less important immediate consequences. 
7. My behaviour is generally influenced by future consequences. 
 
 
CFC-Immediate 
8. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of it-
self. 
9. My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or 
weeks) outcomes of my actions.  
10. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take. 
11. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the 
problems will be resolved before they reach crisis level. 
12. I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be 
dealt with at a later time.  
13. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future 
problems that may occur at a later date. 
14. Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me 
than behavior that has distant outcomes. 
 
 
Appendix C 
Frederick (2005): 
Certain gains vs. Higher expected value gambles 
1. 1000 euros for sure or a 90 % chance of 5000 euros 
2. 100 euros for sure or a 90% chance of 500 euros 
3. 1000 euros for sure or a 75% chance of 4000 euros 
4. 100 euros for sure or a 75% chance of 200 euros 
5. 100 euros for sure or a 75% chance of 150 euros 
6. 100 euros for sure or a 50% chance of 300 euros 
7. 500 euros for sure or a 15% chance of 1 000 000 euros 
8. 100 euros for sure or a 3% chance of 7000 euros 
 
Certain gains vs. Lower expected value gambles 
9. 100 euros for sure or a 25% chance of 200 euros 
10. 100 euros for sure or a 25% chance of 300 euros 
11. 5 euros for sure or a 4% chance of 80 euros 
12. 5 euros for sure or a 1% chance of 80 euros 
13. 60 euros for sure or a 1% chance of 5000 euros 
 
Certain losses vs. Lower expected value gambles 
14. Lose 10 euros for sure or a 90 % chance to lose 50 euros 
15. Lose 100 euros for sure or a 75% chance to lose 200 euros 
16. Lose 100 euros for sure or a 50% chance to lose 300 euros 
17. Lose 50 euros for sure or a 10% chance to lose 800 euros 
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18. Lose 100 euros for sure or a 3% chance to lose 7000 euros 
 
 
Appendix D 
Rawlings, Tapola & Niemivirta (2017): 
Temperament as reward and punishment sensitivities 
 
Sensitivity to punishment  
1. I am easily shy in the company of people I don’t know and in new situations. 
2. I feel very uncomfortable in new situations and places. 
3. I avoid talking or performing in public (e.g., at lectures). 
4. I withdraw easily in difficult or awkward situations.  
5. I get upset easily if I am criticized or told off. 
 
Intraindividual reward sensitivity – positive expressiveness 
1. I express my excitement and enjoyment openly, when I succeed at something. 
2. I don’t hold back my joy and enthusiasm when something nice happens to me. 
 
Interindividual reward sensitivity 
1. I sometimes act hastily just to get an immediate reward or praise. 
2. I often do things just to be praised. 
3. I will gladly be the centre of attention. 
4. I often aim to impress other people. 
 
Intraindividual reward sensitivity – novelty-seeking 
1. I will readily seek out novel situations. 
2. I think it is exciting to get into new and surprising situations. 
3. I get excited about new things easily. 
 
 
 
